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jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR. 2018.750 Richard Nixon allowed the CIA to provide logistical and technical support to Chilean military dissidents as they planned a coup d'état against the democratically-elected Chilean President Salvador Allende (Grandin 2006; Sikkink 2007) . Although President John F. Kennedy and subsequent presidents failed to unseat the Cuban communists, this became the exception that proved the rule in Latin America for much of the Cold War: the United States would successfully support right-wing counter-revolutionaries and, for a time, seemingly stable dictatorships. 2 During the 1980s, the United States somewhat strangely shifted its foreign policy approach towards Latin America, among other regions of the world. Instead of directly supporting rightwing authoritarian leaders, U.S. elites began to cultivate moderate political actors that would promote neoliberal economic policies and embrace U.S. national security interests. In doing so, the United States promoted a transition towards a democratic model that would allow these moderate actors the ability to succeed at the polls. In Chile, for instance, the U.S. government gradually reduced support for General Augusto Pinochet, criticized his style of rule, and funded moderate political parties that eventually took power following a democratic transition.
William Robinson (1996) , and others who have taken influence from his work, have more accurately described this U.S. strategy involving democracy promotion as "promoting polyarchy."
That is, instead of championing dictatorial regimes, they argue that the United States promotes a limited form of democracy wherein moderate elite actors who embrace the United States and its policies win electoral contests. Robinson (1996) and others have demonstrated how the United States funneled much funding and support towards particular moderate groups so they might electorally compete best at the polls and usher in a limited democratic model. Much has changed, though, since the end of the Cold War. While Latin American citizens indeed initially supported many moderate political candidates that received U.S. backing and promoted neoliberal policies, they began to reject these leaders and their policies by the end of the 21 st century (Ellner 2008; Silva 2009; Stahler-Sholk et al 2008) . In response to the failures of neoliberalism, grassroots social movements in many places throughout Latin America sprung up and began to emphasize the idea of participatory democracy, the redistribution of wealth, and a rejection of U.S. imperial power (Ciccariello-Maher 2013; Silva 2009; Smilde 2011; Stahler-Sholk et al 2008) . In 1998, for instance, Venezuelans elected former President Hugo Chávez, who ran on a platform that criticized neoliberal capitalist policies and U.S. hegemony, and prioritized the idea of rewriting the Venezuelan Constitution to emphasize the idea of participatory democracy (Smilde 2011) . In the years that followed, Chávez endorsed a socialist style of governance, funded the extensive creation of democratic community councils and communes, criticized the U.S. War jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2018.750
on Terror, aligned with several U.S. enemies, and led efforts to create regional bodies that deliberately excluded the United States (Corrales and Romero 2013; Ellner 2008; Smilde and Gill 2013 Instead of consolidating nascent democracies and funding political parties to contest rightwing authoritarian actors, the U.S. government has sought to bolster political parties and NGOs that now contest democratically-elected leftist governments that encourage participatory democratic reform. In this paper, I illustrate how the United States attempted to destabilize far-left governments in Latin America through diplomatic measures and direct support for opposition groups. This strategy harkens back to U.S. foreign policy as it was largely conceived during the Cold War: directly challenging far left governments throughout the region that were democratically elected.
In this paper, I draw attention to three particular instances of U.S. foreign policy towards far left, Latin American governments: Venezuela under Chávez (1999 , Bolivia under Morales (2006-present), and Nicaragua under Ortega (2007-present) . Under the guise of promoting democracy, the United States has largely worked through the quasi-governmental National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
I show that individuals within these organizations actively worked alongside U.S. state elites to destabilize these far left governments. To do so, they financed and provided technical support to opposition political parties and opposition NGOs, and, in some instances, U.S. state elites directly threatened far left leaders with reprisal. While the U.S. government formerly funded groups in order to push out despotic governments and, thereafter, funded programs designed to consolidate existing democracies, it now utilizes its "democracy promotion" strategies, in part, to destabilize far leftist leaders that have received the electoral support of their populace. In these locations, the United States does not work to strengthen existing democratic institutions, but rather assists preferred parties in their bid to occupy existing political institutions.
U.S. Empire, Democracy Promotion, and the Rise of the Left in Latin America
Social scientists generally link the rise of the U.S. Empire to the consequences that befell the world following World War II (Go 2011; Mann 2013; Nye 2015 spread European military forces too thin, and ultimately paved way for a final wave of anti-colonial revolution throughout the Global South. The United States, on the other hand, hosted no warfare with the exception of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. As a result, U.S. industry increasingly supplied products throughout the world, and, what is more, provided Western European governments with economic aid packages so they might rebuild their national industries and stifle any communist movements that developed, such as in Greece and Italy.
As the lone global empire, the United States utilized an array of strategies to maintain its dominant position. However, unlike former European colonial powers, it did not primarily rely upon strategies of colonialism. Julian Go (2008) has shown that this was not due to some form of American exceptionalism whereby U.S. leaders eschewed exercising colonial domination and simply possessed more benevolence than their European counterparts. The United States, in fact, colonized several territories, for example, following the Spanish-American War in 1898, including Cuba and Guam. Following World War II, though, Go (2008) has shown how an anti-colonial consciousness diffused throughout the Global South, and, in many parts, the USSR had encouraged anti-colonial revolution. As a result, the U.S. government recognized that if it did not also champion these movements, newly independent governments would align with the USSR. Given East-West Cold War dynamics, the United States could not allow this and sought allies wherever it could.
Instead of a formal form of empire then, the United States has utilized other, non-territorial tactics in an attempt to maintain global domination. This has involved hard power approaches, including military invasion and support for military overthrows, and it has involved less violent, soft power tactics, such as providing particular political parties with financial and material resources so they might electorally outcompete other parties (Mann 2013; Nye 2015; Robinson 1996 imperialism and neoliberal economic policies, while other regional progressives were not nearly as provocative in both their rhetoric and policy (Rojas 2017) . These four leaders most enthusiastically pursued participatory democratic reforms, socialist economic policies, and a rejection of U.S. hegemony around the region. 3 In this sense, these four leaders are understood as the far left in Latin America, in comparison with other progressive leaders.
Given that these far leftist Latin American leaders directly challenged the United States by criticizing both U.S. economic and security policies, how did the U.S. government respond to these leaders, particularly through its democracy promoting agencies? The remainder of this paper addresses this question by examining U.S. foreign policy, particularly U.S. democracy promotion strategies, in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. I begin with Venezuela and the Chávez government, given that Chávez became the first democratically elected, far left president in a wave of candidates. Thereafter, I discuss dynamics in Bolivia and Nicaragua. Methods This paper utilizes three particular case studies involving U.S. democracy promotion strategies towards three far left governments in contemporary Latin America: Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. In doing so, the aim of the paper is to illustrate how the United States has responded to the far left -that is, not the U.S. response to Latin American progressives or Latin American leaders more generally. Rather, the focus remains on those Latin American governments that have embraced the most radical positions on the leftist end of the political spectrum. These governments have embraced socialist policies, participatory democratic reforms, and explicitly rejected U.S. The data for each of these case studies comes from un-redacted U.S. diplomatic cables drafted by U.S. state elites, and, in the case study involving Venezuela, interviews that I conducted with U.S. state elites who directly dealt with issues involving foreign policy towards Venezuela under Chávez. In terms of the latter data, I interviewed 18 individuals from the U.S. foreign policymaking community in a number of locations, including Caracas, Venezuela; Washington, D.C.; and over Skype/telephone. This included individuals who had worked for U.S. democracy promoting agencies, like the NED and USAID, as well as U.S. diplomats, such as former ambassadors and members of the U.S. Department of State. In order to access these individuals, I relied upon initial contacts I developed within Venezuelan civil society and from there I largely utilized a snowball sample, asking those that I interviewed for suggestions on who I might also contact to discuss issues related to U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela during the years of Chávez. Thereafter, I coded these interviews for thematic content, including how individuals interacted with Venezuelan government members, how they sought to promote democracy in Venezuela, what groups received support, and their understandings of the Venezuelan government and their political-economic practices, among other topics.
Sections on Bolivia and Nicaragua, in addition to Venezuela, primarily involve the use of U.S. diplomatic cables that detail U.S. foreign policy and democracy promotion efforts within these countries in the early 21 st century. Private Chelsea Manning initially secured these documents and then released them in 2010, where they found a home within the online PlusD Database, where browsers may access them. Cables each emerge from respective U.S. embassies stationed all throughout the world, which allows researchers to intensively map out U.S. foreign policy approaches in many different countries. These cables primarily emerged from U.S.
embassies located in Caracas, Venezuela; La Paz, Bolivia; and Managua, Nicaragua.
The PlusD Database possesses a user-friendly search function that allows the user to easily sift through tens of thousands of diplomatic cables. Most importantly for this project, users may filter for time frame and countries of origin. In doing so, users and researchers can easily narrow their search and uncover only those cables that they wish to look through. In addition, the database contains the ability to search for specific terms. This functionality was particularly helpful for this project, because it allowed searches for terms associated with U.S. democracy promotion policies.
Given that these policies are largely carried out by USAID and the NED and its associated groups, cables were examined that contain reference to these organizations and their efforts within each respective country. Thereafter, each cable was examined for thematic content, and cables were identified that detailed particular U.S. aims within each respective country. Through the use of these cables, one can piece together the main thrust of these democracy promoting organizations' endeavors in each particular country under analysis. Outside the palace, news reached Chávez's supporters in the poor neighborhoods that he had not yet resigned and all of these efforts amounted to an undemocratic and unconstitutional coup d'état.
His supporters swarmed the presidential palace and nearby streets, demanding his return, and soldiers who remained loyal to the democratically elected government occupied the presidential palace, eventually pushing the transitional government out.
In the aftermath of the coup, Chávez blamed the United States for conspiring with the opposition to overthrow him, as a result of his embrace of participatory democracy, rejection of neoliberalism, and criticism of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. government acknowledged that some of its funding went to individuals that participated in and supported the coup and transitional government, but it claimed that it always shot down any suggestions of supporting a coup and even informed Chávez when those plots arose (OIG 2002) . Nonetheless, these events solidified an extensive deterioration in relations between the two countries (Beeton et al 2015; Clement 2005 ).
In the ensuing years, Chávez solidified his anti-U.S. tendencies by aligning with anti-U.S. and construct party platforms (Clement 2005 Democratica, COPEI, and Primero Justicia. The forum centered on party leaders working out personal rivalries in order to create "a common vision for the country" (IRI 2001: 4) . IRI leaders believed that it would serve the opposition well if they could work out their rivalries and put forward a common solution to the dilemmas confronting Venezuela. In addition, they asserted that the purpose of the roundtable was not solely to condemn Chávez, "but to create a framework allowing the parties to work together and discuss future challenges" (IRI 2001: 4-5) . In the end, the IRI pointed out that they would provide technical assistance to the opposition, but "the parties themselves must take certain initiatives for such efforts to be truly effective" (IRI 2001: 5) . Despite this, one individual who helped to run IRI seminars during this time told me that the ultimate purpose of these efforts was the help the opposition "get [their] shit together, so they could defeat Goldberg planned and met with members from these opposition movements that were challenging
Morales and pushing for autonomy (Burron 2013 ). In addition, Neil Burron (2013: 124) has asserted that a Fulbright scholar and Peace Corps volunteer "had been asked to spy on Venezuelans and Cubans" within the country. As a result, Morales expelled Goldberg from the country, and the United States reciprocated, removing the Bolivian Ambassador.
As in Venezuela, the United States provided the opposition with technical and financial support through USAID and the NED and its associated groups. And, as in Venezuela, these programs concerned the Morales Administration. USAID programs, in particular, garnered the attention of the Bolivian government. Alexander Main et al (2015) point out that after the election of Morales, USAID redirected their efforts away from the national government and towards regional governments that were largely headed by governors opposed to the new administration. Main et al. (2015: 508) indicate that U.S. diplomats, for example, met and worked with opposition activists that plainly stated they were considering "blowing up gas lines" in order to counteract Bolivian government projects.
USAID funding also flowed to individuals that sought to prevent additional efforts taken by the Morales government. When the Morales government sought to construct a new constitution, for instance, USAID engaged in a concerted effort to fund groups opposed to this process and groups critical of additional MAS government policies. Burron (2013: 126) , for instance, reports the country, as they also did in Venezuela, in order to support groups opposed to the Morales government. Despite the Bolivian government's decision to terminate these programs, U.S. diplomats sought to push the Bolivian government to reconsider its decision. In doing so, the U.S. 
Discussion and Conclusions
At the end of the Cold War, Robinson (1996) and others demonstrated the imperial capabilities and successes of the United States and its democracy promotion programs throughout Latin America and other parts of the world. Through newly developed organizations including the NED and its associated groups, alongside USAID, the United States sought to shape political-economic outcomes all across globe, including in Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. Other researchers have also illustrated some U.S. success within Eastern Europe, including Georgia and Serbia, shortly following this period (Mitchell 2009; Spoerri 2015) . Of course, this success is not in encouraging just any type of democracy, but in championing a particular form of democracy headed by moderate leaders. Robinson (1996) and, at times, expropriated, industries during an international boom in the price of commodities, such as oil and natural gas. These dynamics enabled these leaders to establish social programs directed at their countries' poorest populations: the working-class, the poor, single mothers, and the indigenous, among other groups. And, regardless of whether one agrees with their styles of rule, their policies generally diminished levels of poverty, diminished levels of inequality, and generated economic growth, albeit not without criticism that they had not moved far enough to combat neoliberal economic policies (Rojas 2017; Webber 2013 In the end, we can surely expect U.S. democracy promotion efforts to continue in the years to come. Despite the Trump Administration's calls to cut funding for many U.S. state entities, there are as of yet no plans to eliminate democracy assistance programs and/or congressional funding for the NED. What is more, while Trump has praised right-wing authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin in Russia and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, he has recurrently criticized left-wing governments in Cuba and Venezuela. In fact, Trump has even asserted that "a military option" exists to take out the Maduro government. Given these dynamics, we can surely expect U.S. democracy promotion efforts to continue to combat the efforts of far left leaders throughout the region.
The purpose of this paper has been to illustrate how the United States has responded through its democracy promotion agenda to the far left in Latin America at the turn of the 21 st century.
These far left leaders indeed came to power through the ballot box, and one might have conceivably expected the United States to have worked more productively with these governments, given their democratic credentials and the conclusion of the Cold War. However, given these governments criticism of U.S. imperialism, U.S. foreign policy, and neoliberal policies, and given a lengthy and continuing history of U.S. aggression towards global challengers, productive relations never ensued. Rather, a strained, bitter, and ultimately tragic set of relations unfurled, wherein the United States lost potential allies on select issues and the far left in Latin America has had to allocate extensive energy into neutralizing U.S. influence lest it fail to govern into the future.
